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In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,1 the Supreme Court recently held 
that a group of reporters, human rights activists, attorneys, and labor 
organizations lacked Article III standing to challenge the constitutionality of 
§ 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).2 This 5–4 decision 
deals another blow to plaintiffs seeking to challenge government action. The 
Court’s sweeping language represents a harbinger of a more restrictive standing 
doctrine in the federal courts that will especially hinder civil rights and 
environmental plaintiffs.  
I. CLAPPER V. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA  
The challenged FISA section was created through the FISA Amendment 
Act of 2008 (FAA) and was meant to provide additional authority to address the 
challenges of international terrorism. The amendments established a broad 
authority in information collection.3 This new framework, codified at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1881a, permits the Government to seek Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court (FISC) approval of surveillance of non-U.S. persons abroad (and, 
incidentally, at home). The Government is required neither to demonstrate 
probable cause that the surveillance target is a foreign power or agent, nor to 
specify the nature and location of surveillance.4  
Clapper involved a facial constitutional challenge to § 1881a. The 
plaintiffs’ jobs required them to communicate with foreign contacts regarding 
matters that could be deemed related to foreign intelligence information.5 
Consequently, their international communications could be intercepted, and as a 
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 1 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
 2 Id. at 1154–55 (referring to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2006 & Supp. V)). 
 3 Id. at 1144 (citing DAVID KRIS & DOUGLAS WILSON, NAT’L SEC. INVESTIGATIONS & 
PROSECUTIONS § 9:11 (2d ed. 2012)). 
 4 KRIS & WILSON, supra note 3, at § 16:16. 
 5 See Brief in Opposition at 10, Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) 
(No. 11-1025). The plaintiffs discussed a variety of reasons additional preventative actions 
were necessary, including the fear of surveillance inhibiting their ability to cultivate new 
sources or obtain information from family members and potential clients. Id. at 11. 
Additionally, the attorney-plaintiffs suffer an added burden from their professional 
obligation to ensure communications with clients remain confidential. Id. at 12. 
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result of this fear, they took costly, preventative measures to guard against 
interception.6 
Both parties moved for summary judgment.7 The plaintiffs argued that 
§ 1881a violated the Fourth and First Amendments, Article III, and the 
separation of powers principle; and thus asked the court to permanently enjoin 
surveillance under the FAA.8 The Government argued that plaintiffs lacked 
standing to sue. The district court agreed with the Government, finding that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not have a “personal, particularized, 
concrete injury in fact” and were not subjected to surveillance under the FAA.9  
The Second Circuit reversed.10 The court held that there was an objectively 
reasonable likelihood that the plaintiffs’ communications would be intercepted 
in the future and that the plaintiffs were suffering present injuries based on a 
reasonable fear of future governmental conduct.11 The Second Circuit denied 
rehearing en banc by a bitterly divided vote.12 Based on this, and “[b]ecause of 
the importance of the issue and the novel view of standing adopted by the Court 
of Appeals,” the Supreme Court granted further review.13 
Ultimately, in an opinion authored by Justice Alito, the Court reversed the 
Second Circuit, particularly because the claim was premised on a series of 
speculative fears. The core of the Court’s reasoning was that too many 
speculative steps were needed to establish an injury.14 The Court directed its 
reasoning to the first two prongs in standing analysis: injury and causation.  
For the injury analysis, without showing any threat of government 
interception of communication that was “certainly impending,” the plaintiffs 
could not establish a sufficient injury in fact.15 The Court also quickly 
addressed the second injury argument raised—that the preventative measures 
taken by plaintiffs (based upon fear of interception) was a sufficient injury. To 
permit this, the Court stated, would “water[] down the fundamental 
                                                                                                                       
 6 Id. at 16.  
 7 Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 8 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1146. 
 9 Amnesty Int’l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 644, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 10 Amnesty Int’l USA, 638 F.3d at 122. 
 11 Id. at 133–34, 138–39.  
 12 Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 667 F.3d 163, 164 (2d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (noting 
that the Court denied rehearing by a six to six vote). 
 13 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1146.  
 14 Id. at 1148. (“[R]espondents’ argument rests on their highly speculative fear that: (1) 
the Government will decide to target the communications of non-U.S. persons with whom 
they communicate; (2) in doing so, the Government will choose to invoke its authority under 
§ 1881a rather than utilizing another method of surveillance; (3) the Article III judges who 
serve on the [FISC] will conclude that the Government’s proposed surveillance procedures 
satisfy § 1881a’s many safeguards and are consistent with the Fourth Amendment; (4) the 
Government will succeed in intercepting the communications of respondents’ contacts; and 
(5) respondents will be parties to the particular communications that the Government 
intercepts.”).  
 15 Id. at 1143. 
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requirements of Article III.”16 However, footnote 5 muted this hard line. Justice 
Alito stated that a “substantial risk” of future harm would be sufficient when a 
plaintiff pleads and proves concrete facts showing that the defendant’s actions 
caused the risk.17  
Further, the plaintiffs were unable to establish a causal link between the 
harm and the Government. The Court held that the alleged harm was tenuously 
connected to the Government’s potential future surveillance. Without a 
“certainly impending” harm, the plaintiffs could not manufacture injury by 
inflicting themselves through economic expenditures.18 
Justice Breyer, writing for the four dissenters, vigorously opposed the 
majority’s reliance upon the “certainly impending” standard. In fact, Justice 
Breyer argues that in footnote 5, “the majority appears to concede, certainty is 
not, and never has been, the touchstone of standing.”19 Throughout his dissent, 
Justice Breyer highlights that the uncertainty of future harm has not been 
dispositive; rather, the Court has routinely entertained actions for injunctive and 
declaratory relief aimed at preventing future activities that were reasonably 
likely or highly likely to occur. The dissenters would have found the likelihood 
of future interception of confidential communications abroad sufficiently likely 
to establish standing.20  
II. THE CONTINUATION OF A STRICTER STANDING DOCTRINE UNDER THE 
ROBERTS COURT 
Under the Roberts Court, Article III standing has become a threshold 
question21 that blocks public interest litigation.22 Clapper fits the trend. But, the 
                                                                                                                       
 16 Id. at 1152.  
 17 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1150 n.5. 
 18 Id. at 1151. Additionally, the Court found that many of the incentives to protect 
communications with their sources pre-existed the FAA; thus, the alleged harm could not be 
traced to the specific changes brought by the 2008 amendments. Id. at 1152.  
 19 Id. at 1160 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).  
 20 Id. at 1165. The dissent discussed a number of cases involving probabilistic injuries 
that were sufficient to support standing. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1162–63. Also, the dissent 
reviewed cases where the Court found standing when future injuries were accompanied with 
present injuries based on efforts to mitigate these future effects. Id. at 1163–64. Finally, the 
dissent argues that the majority cannot find support in the cases that rely upon “certainly 
impending” to deny standing. Id. at 1164–65. 
 21 See Jess Bravin, Court Under Roberts Limits Judicial Power: Conservative Shift Sets 
Hurdles for Litigants; Businesses Get a Break, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2007. But see Jonathan 
H. Adler, Standing Still in the Roberts Court, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1061, 1064 (2009) 
(discussing how the Roberts Court had made it easier for some litigants to pursue their 
claims in federal court).  
 22 The term “public interest litigation” broadly refers to cases against government 
action—frequently in the context of environmental and civil rights litigation. See, e.g., Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 555 (1992) (denying Article III standing for claims 
of injuries to interests in studying and observing wildlife overseas). 
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Court’s broad language and reliance upon “certainly impending” harm to 
establish injury in fact could herald an even stricter standard for all claims. The 
application of Clapper by the lower courts is likely to be even more 
restrictive—throwing out civil rights and environmental suits on procedural 
grounds.23  
Clapper coincides with a number of recent cases that have narrowly viewed 
standing requirements. In Summers v. Earth Island Institute,24 the plaintiffs 
challenged a Forest Service regulation that exempted certain timber sales from 
public comment and administrative appeal. There, the plaintiffs based standing 
upon the regulation’s impact on their aesthetic enjoyment and recreational use 
of the forest. The Court, in a 5–4 decision, found this harm too remote and 
unlikely to occur.25 Specifically, while there was a chance this harm would 
occur, it was hardly likely that plaintiff’s “wanderings will bring him to a parcel 
about to be affected.”26 In Daimler Chrysler Corp v. Cuno,27 the Court found 
taxpayers challenging the constitutionality of a tax break offered to car 
manufacturers lacked standing because their injury depended upon two 
additional actions occurring before being harmed.28  
The Clapper decision raises the already high bar for public interest 
plaintiffs. A straightforward reading of Clapper means, in contexts like 
environmental litigation, that plaintiffs would need to challenge discrete actions 
rather than overarching government regulations or policy statements.29 
Clapper’s reliance upon the stricter “certainly impending” standard means 
plaintiffs must show a more particularized injury to sue. For example, since 
scientific disagreement on future harm based on exposure to environmental 
toxins exists, it may be virtually impossible for a claimant to show with 
certainty that their exposure will lead to imminent harm.30 This places 
environmental groups with limited resources at a strategic disadvantage.  
                                                                                                                       
 23 See Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing at the Crossroads: The Roberts Court in 
Historical Perspective, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 875, 879–80 (2008) (“The Supreme Court’s 
increasingly prominent conservative center of gravity coincides with an overwhelmingly 
conservative set of federal courts of appeals.”). 
 24 555 U.S. 488 (2009). 
 25 Id. at 495–96. 
 26 Id. at 495. 
 27 547 U.S. 332 (2006). 
 28 Id. at 344 (including the depletion of local treasures resulting in the state legislature 
raising taxes to compensate for the loss). 
 29 Eric Biber, Did the Supreme Court Just Shut the Courthouse Door on Environmental 
Plaintiffs?, LEGAL PLANET (Mar. 1, 2013), http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2013/03/01/did-
the-supreme-court-just-shut-the-courthouse-door-on-environmental-plaintiffs/.  
 30 These concerns are not unrealistic. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 440 F.3d 
476, 484 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev’d en banc, 464 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (initially finding that 
plaintiffs lacked standing even when they could establish that exposure to methyl bromide 
would increase cancer deaths in the United States).  
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This result can be replicated in most public interest-oriented litigation. For 
example, in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,31 a plaintiff challenging the citywide 
use of a deadly chokehold could not establish standing to enjoin the policy 
because it was unlikely he would be subjected to the chokehold again.32 But, 
hypothetical scenarios can be imagined.33 Under Clapper, these scenarios 
would never reach a level of certainty. Without subjecting themselves to a 
potentially harmful policy, a plaintiff’s claims will be barred by the heightened 
Clapper standard.  
Additionally, there is merit to the belief that this case is really about 
ripeness34 rather than standing.35 This distinction has caused recent confusion; 
the parties in Summers believed ripeness would be dispositive before the Court 
ruled on standing grounds.36 If plaintiffs must wait to challenge discrete actions 
to meet the “certainly impending” standard, earlier challenges will not be ripe 
for review. The Court can clarify the standing-ripeness boundaries next term 
when it reviews challenges to National Forest planning decisions.37 
Simultaneously, this case may be a simple example of the Court’s hesitancy to 
weigh-in on national defense and security issues.38 
Regardless, Clapper’s impact should influence not only how plaintiffs 
determine what challenges to raise and how to plead their case, but also how 
defendants should respond to the suit. Now, plaintiffs will be required to wait 
until actual injury has occurred.39 Primarily, this will “force plaintiffs to focus 
on challenging individual projects [or actions], rather than agency regulations or 
policy statements.”40 In doing so, litigation will inevitably develop around the 
                                                                                                                       
 31 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
 32 Id. at 109. 
 33 Lyons would need to establish factors which illustrate that future harm is not 
speculative by personalizing the likely future harm. See Thomas v. Cnty. of L.A., 978 F.2d 
504, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that plaintiffs lived within a six to seven block area where 
repeated occurrences of police mistreatment occurred).  
 34 Ripeness is the doctrine which states that judicial review is premature until the 
government program is applied in a particular context. See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 
497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990).  
 35 Biber, supra note 29. 
 36 See Eric Biber & Amanda Leiter, Ripeness and Standing in Environmental Law, 
CONST. L. COMM. NEWSL. (A.B.A. Sec. of Env’t, Energy, & Res., Chicago, Ill.), June 2009, 
at 3.  
 37 Pac. Rivers Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 689 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. 
granted sub nom., U.S. Forest Serv. v. Pac. Rivers Council, 81 U.S.L.W. 3293 (U.S. Mar. 
18, 2013) (No. 12-623). 
 38 Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Makes It Harder to Challenge Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, NPR (Feb. 26, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/ 2013/02/26/ 
172998760/supreme-court-makes-it-harder-to-challenge-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-
act.  
 39 This is because “plaintiffs bear the burden of pleading and proving concrete facts 
showing that the defendant’s actual action has caused the substantial risk of harm.” Clapper, 
133 S. Ct. at 1150 n.5 (majority opinion). 
 40 Biber, supra note 29.  
46 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL FURTHERMORE [Vol. 74 
 
scope of footnote 5. As Justice Breyer’s dissent insists, and the Court’s 
language suggests, the degree of certainty required is amorphous.41 Discerning 
when courts can rely upon a “substantial risk” rather than the “certainly 
impending” standard is unclear at best. Ultimately, the Clapper decision 
presents itself as a continuation in the trend of heightened procedural hoops for 
public interest plaintiffs seeking access to the federal court. Now, more than 
ever, the Roberts Court seems disinterested in “throw[ing] open the doors of the 








                                                                                                                       
 41 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1160 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565 n.2 (1992) (“[I]mminence is concededly a somewhat elastic 
concept.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 42 Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 504 (1982).  
